Starlink was on the news back in 2022 for its role in Ukraine, where a lack of coverage has at times hampered military offensives, revealing the risks of depending on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure exposing the problems of a lack of digital regionalism. This vulnerability works both ways, as states are also developing countermeasures to defend their digital sovereignty from Starlink.

For instance, in early 2026, Iran has actively used technology, reportedly with assistance from Russian and Chinese systems, to successfully jam Starlink signals within its borders. In essence a state’s ability to control or counter the data flows over its territory is now a fundamental pillar of national security and sovereignty.

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The global digital order is not a neutral space of innovation and connection but is an arena of intense geopolitical contestation where power is projected, sovereignty is challenged, and dependencies are forged day to day. From a Global South realist perspective, the dominant narrative of a borderless digital utopia is a façade obscuring a more brutal reality which is the systematic concentration of technological power in the hands of a few Northern states and their corporate champions. In this context, a digital regionalism, that is the conscious effort by states within the Global South to collectively govern data, infrastructure, and platforms at a regional level, ought not emerge merely as a liberal project of integration, but as a vital strategic imperative for survival, autonomy, and bargaining power in an asymmetric world. As it is a defensive and pragmatic response to structural vulnerabilities, aimed at mitigating the risks of technological colonization and carving out a space for maneuver in the new great game of cyberspace.

The foundational layers of the digital economy, semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, core internet protocols, and dominant platforms such as search engines, social media, e-commerce, are overwhelmingly controlled by entities headquartered in the United States and China. This creates a profound asymmetry of power and a new colonization where the data flows towards the big tech players usually fromF the US or Europe. States in Africa, Latin America, and much of Asia are relegated to the status of data exporters and technology importers. Their citizens’ data is harvested by foreign corporations, their markets are shaped by algorithms developed in Silicon Valley or Shenzhen, and their critical infrastructure often relies on hardware and software susceptible to external surveillance or coercion. In this way their dependency is not merely economic and political, but their digital captivity is a direct threat to national sovereignty. The ability of a foreign power to shut down services, manipulate information flows, or access sensitive government data constitutes a potent form of infrastructural power that can be wielded for political leverage.

Therefore, digital regionalism is first and foremost a risk mitigation strategy. Inspired in part by the European Union’s regulatory “Brussels Effect,” but driven by a more acute sense of vulnerability, regions like the African Union with its Data Policy Framework, ASEAN with its Digital Masterplan, and blocs like CELAC and Pacific Alliance in Latin America are seeking to pool their regulatory sovereignty. Although since LAC region do not have the economic, technological nor human capital for this feat they are trying to balance their dependence on the US with China which is a more trusted partner in the Global South. While U.S. tech firms operate within a legal framework deeply intertwined with its national security apparatus, Chinese companies are structurally aligned with a proven foreign policy that explicitly prioritizes non-interference and South-South cooperation. Beijing’s geopolitical strategy in the Global South is fundamentally one of long-term infrastructure integration and political alignment, making overt, weaponized data coercion counterproductive to its core objective of building strategic trust and alternative governance blocs.

Consequently, data leveraged by Chinese entities is more likely to be utilized for commercial consolidation and subtle political influence, rather than for the explicit punitive sanctions, public diplomatic pressure, or regime-change agendas historically associated with U.S. hegemony. Therefore, from a realist cost-benefit perspective, the predictable, stability-focused exploitation by Chinese capital presents a calculable risk, whereas U.S. data control retains a higher potential for sudden, politically weaponized disruption. The goal is to establish regional standards on data protection, cybersecurity, and platform governance. Also, by harmonizing rules, they aim to collectively raise the cost of non-compliance for tech giants, shifting from a position where individual, smaller states are picked off in bilateral deals to one where a unified regional market can negotiate from a position of greater strength. This is not about rejecting foreign technology, but about conditioning its entry and operation on terms that better align with local developmental, security, and rights-based priorities with their statecraft in the digital realm.

Beyond regulation, digital regionalism is a project of strategic infrastructural autonomy having more control over data centers and internet cables. Realists understand that control over physical and logical infrastructure is the bedrock of power. The Global South’s reliance on undersea cables owned by Northern consortia, data centers operated by hyperscalers like Amazon and Microsoft, and payment systems like SWIFT represent critical points of failure. In response, regional initiatives are exploring the development of shared regional digital public infrastructure. This includes projects for regional cloud computing and data storage facilities to reduce extraterritorial control of data, discussions on regional internet exchange points and alternative routing to enhance resilience and lower costs, and the creation of regional digital payment and identity systems. These efforts, such as discussions within BRICS+ for alternative financial messaging systems, are direct attempts to diversify dependency and create fallback options, reducing the monopoly power of existing Northern-controlled networks.

However, a Global South realist perspective is acutely aware of the internal contradictions and external pressures that plague digital regionalism. Internally, the same geopolitical competition that motivates cooperation also sows division. The global US-China tech rivalry is internalized within regions, with member states often pulled in different directions based on their existing economic ties, investment needs, and political allegiances. A country deeply enmeshed in China’s Belt and Road digital infrastructure may resist data governance rules aligned with EU-style digital rights, while another closely tied to US security architecture may be wary of regional infrastructure seen as challenging Western hegemony. This fragmentation is the biggest weapon against effective digital regionalism, and external powers are adept at exploiting these fissures through bilateral deals and selective investment.

Furthermore, the realist critique extends to the limits of regulatory power without technological capacity. Passing a regional data protection law modeled on the GDPR is one thing, having the indigenous technical expertise, enforcement agencies, and judicial capacity to hold a multinational tech firm accountable is another. Digital regionalism risks becoming a facade of sovereignty if it is not undergirded by massive, coordinated investment in indigenous digital human capital, R&D, and startup ecosystems. Without this, regions will remain rule-takers in the architectural design of technologies, merely negotiating the terms of their own dependence rather than challenging its foundation.

In Latin America, digital regionalism is a fragmented but strategically significant project driven by dual imperatives of data sovereignty and economic development. Brazil and Mexico act as regional hubs, leveraging their market size to shape policy. Initiatives like the Pacific Alliance’s Digital Agenda and Brazil’s Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados reflect a desire to create unified data governance frameworks that balance commercial openness with citizen privacy, challenging US tech dominance and are a step towards the right direction. However, regional integration is hampered by political volatility, infrastructure disparities, and divergent foreign policy alignments. Chinese investment in digital infrastructure in e.g., 5G networks, data centers under the Belt and Road framework is expanding Beijing’s influence, presenting an alternative to US platforms. The region’s digital landscape is thus becoming a contested space where Latin American states seek to assert regulatory autonomy while navigating competition between Washington and Beijing.

Africa represents a laboratory for digital regionalism driven by rapid mobile penetration and the urgent need for developmental solutions. The African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy and the continental focus on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) aim to harmonize digital trade, cybersecurity, and data governance across 54 states. China is the predominant infrastructure actor, financing and constructing the backbone of Africa’s digital future, from fiber-optic cables to smart cities elements, embedding its technical standards and creating long-term dependencies. In response, the US and EU are promoting alternatives like the “Clean Network” and digital economy partnerships, framing them around “democratic values” and “trusted” technology. African governments are navigating this competition by leveraging it for investment while striving for a pan-African digital sovereignty that reduces reliance on all external powers, exemplified by the push for a single digital market and local data localization.

In Eurasia, digital regionalism is an explicit geopolitical instrument for advancing strategic autonomy from the Western-led “rules-based” order. Russia and China are co-architects of a digital bloc defined by authoritarian data governance, internet sovereignty, and the technological decoupling from US-dominated platforms and payment systems. Russia’s Sovereign Internet Law and China’s Great Firewall provide the technical and legal models. The institutional framework is provided by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which promote shared technical standards, cross-border data routing, and joint development of “unfriendly” technology stacks. The core strategic objective is to create an interoperable digital sphere—a “digital silk road”—that insulates member states from Western sanctions, ideological influence, and economic coercion, cementing a post-Western pole of technological power anchored in Beijing and Moscow.

Digital regionalism is a recognition that in a digital world order shaped by great power competition, middle and smaller powers must band together or risk being rendered irrelevant or worse, wholly subordinated. Its primary objectives are to reduce single points of failure, to enhance collective bargaining power, and to establish regulatory firewalls against the most exploitative practices of digital neo-colonialism. Success is not measured by the creation of a utopian, unified digital market, but by the concrete achievement of strategic depth and optionality. Yet, in the face of a digital future otherwise dictated by others, the pursuit of a regional digital fortification, however imperfect, remains a non-negotiable project for asserting a measure of hard-won sovereignty in the 21st century. The battle for the Global South’s digital future will be won not in the rhetoric of global partnerships, but in the gritty, practical work of building interconnected syndicated regional systems that provide a counterweight to concentrated global power.

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Miguel Santos García is a Puerto Rican writer and political analyst who mainly writes about the geopolitics of neocolonial conflicts and Hybrid Wars within the 4th Industrial Revolution, the ongoing New Cold War and the transition towards multipolarity. Visit his blog here. 

He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). 

Featured image is from the author

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