In 2025, Matthew Fuhrmann wrote, “U.S. Allies and Adversaries Are Attempting Nuclear Deterrence Without Weapons – Will It Work?,” where he argued countries don’t always need to go as far as actually building nuclear weapons to reap the benefits of nuclear deterrence. A year later, we asked Matthew to revisit his arguments.Image: MidjourneyIn your 2025 article, you argued countries don’t necessarily have to follow through with building nuclear weapons to reap the benefits of nuclear deterrence, a strategy you called latent nuclear deterrence. Which countries do you think stand to gain the most from this strategy, given the significant and, in some cases, unfavorable shifts in the geopolitical landscape?The path for countries seeking leverage from latent nuclear capabilities can be rocky and uncertain, but the theory holds that three conditions maximize the likelihood of success. The first is having the means to make fissile material — weapons-grade highly enriched uranium or plutonium — a critical ingredient for a nuclear bomb. Being able to reassure others that the weapons-capable country is not bent on arming is a second requirement. The third condition is high stakes, which are needed to make threats credible in latent deterrence.I argued in 2025 that Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan are particularly well positioned to meet the requirements for success, and I still believe this to be the case. All three have the means to make fissile material. Given this capability, everyone understands that these countries could build a bomb quickly if they so desired. However, few (if any) foreign observers believe they currently have Manhattan Project-like programs underway. These countries should therefore have better luck gaining leverage from their nuclear programs in situations where threats to build or eventually use nuclear weapons are believable. U.S. allies could direct their latent deterrent threats at adversaries such as China,